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Abstract 
 
This article addresses three topics. First, it reports on the international interest in the health care 
reforms of Switzerland and The Netherlands in the 1990s and early 2000s that operate under the 
label “managed competition” or “consumer-driven health care.” Second, the article reviews the 
behavior assumptions that make plausible the case for the model of “managed competition.” 
Third, it analyzes the actual reform experience of Switzerland and Holland to assess to what 
extent they confirm the validity of those assumptions. The article concludes that there is a triple 
gap in understanding of those topics: a gap between the theoretical model of managed 
competition and the reforms as implemented in both Switzerland and The Netherlands; second, a 
gap between the expectations of policy-makers and the results of the reforms, and third, a gap 
between reform outcomes and the observations of external commentators that have embraced the 
reforms as the ultimate success of “consumer-driven health care.” The article concludes with a 
discussion of the implications of this “triple gap.”  
 
 
 
 
1  Introduction 
 
Switzerland and The Netherlands, two small Western European countries with populations of 8 
and 16 million respectively, have figured prominently in the health policy literature as leading 
examples of “consumer-driven health care”. Switzerland (in 1996) and Holland (in 2006) 
introduced a mandate for all legal residents to take out (private) health insurance, replacing pre- 
existing public and private insurance. Those reforms, heralded as cost-saving measures and 
typically described as instances of “managed competition,” prompted great interest abroad [1-6]. 
Some commentators embraced the “Dutch market model” as a solution for the United States 
[4,7]. Naik [4] described the Dutch system as “...a model of competition and a small dose of 
regulation,” with “individuals buying coverage”…. “that replaced ‘state-run schemes’.”  Gruber 
[8] claimed that “(n)ations like The Netherlands and Switzerland….have achieved universal 
coverage within a private insurance structure, … [and] ... control costs better than we do.”  Other 
commentators, however, argued that government regulation, not competition, had been the major 
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factor in controlling health expenditure [9]. Finally, Krugman [10] explained the essential 
features of Obamacare to US citizens as follows: “Basically, it’s a plan to Swissify America, 
using regulation and subsidies to ensure universal coverage”.  
In the meantime, other countries have sought to follow the Dutch and Swiss reforms. For 
example, in early 2012, the Irish government announced its intention to implement the Dutch 
insurance model within 5 years [11]. Likewise, governments in Spain (especially Catalunia) and 
Germany [12] have expressed serious interest in the insurance mandate. 
   
The Theory of Managed (Regulated) Competition 
 
What precisely constituted this policy model? According to one commentator: “…the 
essence of regulated competition is to introduce competition while upholding fundamental social 
values in health care, in particular solidarity in health care financing and universal access to 
health care” [13]. Mentioning purposes claimed for managed competition, however, does not 
explain how regulated (or managed) competition is supposed to work to realize such goals. Other 
commentators assume there is enough general agreement about the meaning of managed 
competition to use the term without further explanation [e.g. 6, 14]. 
The core assumptions underlying the theory of “managed competition” or of  “consumer-
driven health care” appear in practice to be fourfold. First, cost-conscientious and well-informed 
consumers who are mandated to take out health insurance will, it is taken for granted,  shop 
around for an insurance plan that best satisfies their (current and future) health care wants.2 
Second, responding to that pressure, (competing) health insurers will act as prudent buyers of 
patient-friendly, higher quality and cheaper services on behalf of their insured. Third, health care 
providers will compete on price, quality and consumer responsiveness. And four, government 
will (largely) step back, letting the market forces allocate scarce resources efficiently [2, 15, 16]. 
Based on all those (theoretical) assumptions, the major actors in the health care domain should 
be willing and able to play their attributed role in order to reach the desired outcomes of 
managed competition: an efficient allocation of scarce resources for health care services that 
satisfy the needs and demands of patients and insured and help control health expenditure.  
But are those assumptions--and the label “consumer-driven health care”--warranted? 
What explains the particular health reform pathways in Switzerland and The Netherlands? What 
happened in the two countries after they introduced the insurance mandates? The Dutch reforms 
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“allocated an important role to patients or consumers” [5]. Does that mean that Dutch health 
insurers nowadays organize health care in a way that patients or insured find most attractive? Or 
do they restrict patient choice by selectively contracting cheaper or perhaps more cost-effective 
care? Do they manage care, or manage costs? Did they really create “integrated delivery 
systems” as Van de Ven and Schut [7] appear to claim? And, importantly, should the Swiss and 
Dutch experiences encourage other countries to follow suit?   
To address those questions, this contribution combines economic, political and policy 
analysis. It assesses both the claims in the literature and the realities of managed competition in 
Swiss and Dutch health care. It describes the current health care systems of both countries, 
concentrating on the financing, contracting and provision of health care services as well as 
administration and government regulation (see [17] for a discussion of those “core elements” of 
health care systems). Theories of path dependency (with rare “windows of opportunity” for 
major change) and notions of “voice” and “exit” [18] help explain the particular health reform 
pathways and outcomes of the two nations.  
 
 
2 Switzerland and The Netherlands: “Consumer-Driven Health Care”? 
 
Switzerland and Holland—like the majority of other countries in Western Europe—share the 
goals of safeguarding universal access to good quality health care while restraining public 
expenditure. The two countries share a legacy of social insurance, one based on an (implicit) 
social contract between state and society, with powerful expectations that governments are--and 
will remain--responsible for making health care accessible for all citizens. Both nations have 
since the 1970s had lengthy debates about the future course of their health care systems. In the 
end, both implemented population-wide mandates requiring individual citizens to buy (private) 
health insurance. In both countries, strong veto powers of organized stakeholders forced 
governments to adjust, slow down or even abandon health reform efforts [19, 20].   
 There are of course major differences in the political systems of the two countries. 
Switzerland is a federal state that delegates much social policy-making to the Canton level 
whereas Holland is a unitary state. The Dutch parliamentary democracy--with coalition 
governments that require consensus and compromise—faces pressure to soften the consequences 
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of policy measures. Despite the differences, the reform processes in both countries reveal several 
similarities. 
 
Switzerland 
 
Switzerland is a highly decentralized Federal State composed of 26 Cantons. It combines a 
tradition of social security with direct democracy (referendum and popular vote) and a liberal 
economic culture that together provide a high degree of “voice” and “exit” opportunities to its 
citizens [20]. Private stakeholders are systematically involved in decision-making, by 
institutionalized participation mechanisms at the political level (consultation procedure), through 
strong lobbying activity in the Parliament as well as by the right to be represented in the different 
control and management agencies [21]. The long tradition of “médicine libérale” (physicians’ 
freedom to establish practice, and patients’ free choice of physician or hospital) has hindered 
efforts to rein in hospital capacity or control costs. Together, those features have resulted in a 
rapid rise of overall health expenditure as well as large regional variations in hospital capacity 
[22], health care expenditure [23], and financial burdens to families [24, 25]. They also resulted 
in seemingly insurmountable barriers to nation-wide reform. 3    
Swiss residents have been required to purchase basic health care coverage with one of the 
many insurers since 1996. Most health insurers have shed their traditional identity as regional, 
religious, or occupation-based social insurance agency, and operate now as national commercial 
firms [26]. They face extensive federal government regulation: they all have to offer the same 
range of basic entitlements, charge community-rated premiums, cannot engage in underwriting; 
moreover, they have to be not-for-profit entities as long when offering compulsory cover. They 
have to contract with all health care providers in the Cantons where they operate, and insured 
citizens have virtually unlimited choice of health care provider. Cantons are responsible for the 
planning of hospitals and long term care facilities as well as the supervision of health insurance. 
The latter includes the monitoring of adherence to the health insurance mandate, and the 
distribution of fiscal subsidies to low income families for purchasing insurance. 
Health insurers receive budget allocations that compensate for differences in their 
portfolio; until 2011 risk adjustment was based on rather crude criteria and considered only 
gender and age classes. Starting from 2012 the formula has been improved and takes now into 
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account as additional factor the hospitalization or stay in a nursing home of at least three days in 
the previous year [27, 28]. Low-income families can apply for state subsidies to purchase health 
insurance (though the amount has not kept pace with the rising premiums). The share of fiscal 
subsidies in total premiums was 16% in 1996, raised up to 20.6% in 1999, declining to 18% in 
2010. Between 1998 and 2009 average health insurance premiums grew by 63%, average 
household income only by 12%.  
Swiss insured can opt for alternative plans with lower premiums. These plans entail 
selective contracting, gate-keeping by general practitioners, and models that imply financial 
incentives to providers for complying with practice guidelines [29, 30]. The membership of such 
alternative “managed care” plans rose from 2 to 8 per cent between 1996 and 1997, but that 
growth leveled off in the next decade [31]. When insurers started to offer a double premium 
discount for managed care contracts with a high deductible, the share went up again and reached 
46.9 percent in 2010.  The switching rate (in particular, “partial exit” to another plan within the 
same insurance holding) rose to 12 percent in 2009 and to 15% in 2010. As in other countries, 
such plans tend to attract younger, healthier, wealthier and better-informed people [27, 32]. In 
reaction, Swiss Parliament passed stricter regulation of managed care plans (under the title 
“integrated networks of care”) in September 2011, but the legislation was swept away by the 
citizens in the referendum held on June 17th 2012. 
There is ample hospital capacity in Switzerland, in 2010 with over 120 acute hospitals 
and 180 private clinics providing their services to the 8 million habitants. The average length of 
stay is high compared to the surrounding countries, and total hospital expenditure of Switzerland 
is amongst the highest in Europe [33]. Medical specialists work in hospitals or in private 
practice. Self-employed health professionals receive fee for service payments. Hospital incomes 
are based on DRG-based payment (covered by health insurers and cantonal taxes in a 45-55 
proportion) as well as fee-for-service payment for outpatient care. All health care faces extensive 
government regulation of federal and cantonal authorities.  
 
The Netherlands 
 
The rules of the 2006 insurance mandate in Holland are similar to those in Switzerland.  All legal 
residents have to take out basic health insurance. The goods and services (entitlements) of the 
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basic coverage more or less equal those of the former social health insurance. In fact, the term 
“basic” is somewhat misleading since the mandatory coverage includes a wide range of health 
care goods and services. Efforts in the last decade to de-list entitlements from the social health 
insurance in Holland (as elsewhere) have not been very successful. They are, in fact, a 
“catalogue of failure” [34].  
All Dutch insurers have to offer the same basic entitlements defined by government, but 
they can–and do--offer a wide variety of supplemental plans. All insured face a mandatory 
deductible of about 170 euros per year (in 2011); they can opt for a higher deductible plan with 
lower premium. In 2011, total health expenditure including the long term care insurance (see 
below) amounted to over 80 billion euros, 5,000 euros (or US$ 6.500) per capita. The Dutch pay 
for medical care and insurance via different ways. All insured pay a flat-rate premium directly to 
their insurer. In 2012, the 48 legally independent insurers all charged between 92 and 118 euros 
per person per month for the basic coverage. Second, employers withhold income-related 
contributions (in fact, earmarked taxes) from the pre-tax income of their employees (in 2012, 
7.1% over the taxable income up to a ceiling of 50.064 euros). Self-employed pay earmarked 
taxes. Third, general taxes finance the flat rate insurance premium for people younger than 18, 
subsidies for medical research and education, the development of information technology, public 
health and many other activities. Four, almost 90% of Dutch insured have taken out 
supplemental insurance of services excluded from basic coverage, such as cosmetic surgery, 
dental care for adults or alternative medicine. Five, there is a separate population-wide social 
insurance for long-term care (including long term stay in nursing homes and other specialized 
institutions, mental care and some other entitlements), the General Long Term Care Act, the 
Algemene Wet Bijzondere Ziektekosten (AWBZ). All legal residents paid 12.15 % of taxable 
income up to 33.400 euros as AWBZ contribution in 2010.  Finally, patients face user fees for 
some drugs and medical treatments, or out of pocket payment for services excluded from the 
basic (in fact, a 100% co-payment).4 In general, however, Dutch patients face modest user fees. 
Co-payments were the lowest of all OECD member states in 2010 (OECD Health Data 2011). 
Low-income families can apply for fiscal subsidy to purchase health insurance, with a maximum 
of 835 euros in 20125. Remarkably, over 50% of the Dutch population qualified for this subsidy. 
Dutch Insurers face similar regulations as their Swiss counterparts, with two major 
differences: the former can choose to act as for-profit or not-for-profit entities, and they do not 
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have to contract all providers in their region. Like their Swiss counterparts, they cannot turn 
down anyone seeking coverage, and  have to charge community-rated premiums. They can offer 
alternative plans with different financial conditions, however, for example a higher deductible 
(with a legal maximum of 500 euros in 2011) in exchange for a lower premium. Insurers in both 
countries receive compensatory subsidy for over-representation of high-risk (or high-cost) 
insured based on an elaborate risk-adjustment formula (in both countries, the formula tends to 
become more elaborate, and more expensive to administer in a search to improve the risk-
predicting capacity of the model).   
The process of implementing the new insurance regime has been complicated and 
difficult. For example, the number of uninsured and delinquent payers (that insurers could strike 
from their rolls after 6 months of non-payment) went up sharply after 2006. At first, the Health 
Ministry decided that any uninsured admitted to a hospital would have to pay the bill, take out 
insurance retroactively and face a substantial fine as well. But after an expert study found that 
young immigrants, welfare recipients and single mothers were overrepresented in the uninsured 
population, the MoH changed course. It set up a separate risk pool that basically took over the 
risks from insurers, but later reinstated the fines. The number of uninsured dropped to about 1 
percent of the population, but (as in Switzerland) the number of delinquent payers (who had 
failed to pay their premiums for over 6 months) rose sharply, to 280,000 or 1.7 percent of the 
population in 2010 [6]. As Glied and her colleagues [35] conclude, mandates are hard to enforce.   
In contrast to Switzerland, Dutch insurers can selectively contract with providers. Yet 
they have been reluctant to break off long-standing contractual relations (perhaps illustrating that 
“exit” is difficult in a small country, where the different actors in health care have long-lasting 
relations). Anticipating on the new scheme, both insurers and providers strengthened their 
market positions by merging with others in the 1980s and 1990s [19]. The announcement of the 
2006 reforms accelerated this process of market concentration. There were 48 legally 
independent health insurers in 2012, most under the umbrella of large banking and insurance 
conglomerates. In fact, four of those conglomerates captured almost 90% of the entire health 
insurance market [36]. As health care providers, too, sought to defend or expand their market 
share, several bilateral market monopolies of insurers and providers emerged that all but defeated 
government competition policy in health care. 
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The number of independent hospitals in Holland had dropped from over 200 in the early 
1980s to about 100 by the turn of the century, after government encouraged hospitals to merge 
with others (often as a precondition for investing in new buildings that also reduced capacity). 
There are hundreds specialized health and long-term care facilities including nursing homes and 
residential homes for handicapped persons that provide medical treatment and long term care, 
and home care organizations. The majority of those facilities are non-profits, but there has been a 
rise of for-profit health care since the 1990s. Most of the 7,000 or so general practitioners work 
in solo practice or small group practices as self-employed practitioners. Medical specialists often 
work in small groups that have contracts with hospitals, but growing numbers of (younger) 
specialists have employment contracts. As in other countries, the last three or four decades have 
seen almost permanent battles over payment modes and payment levels as well as professional 
autonomy of physicians.  
 
3 Outcomes of Consumer Driven Health Care in Switzerland and The Netherlands  
 
There are at least five outcomes “managed competition-”reforms in Holland and in Switzerland 
worth mentioning. First, total health care spending, as well as health insurance premiums, went 
up considerably after the implementation of the insurance mandate (table 1 and 2 below). Both 
countries were well below the OECD average in the 1970s. In Switzerland, total health 
expenditure rose from about 9.6 percent to 11.2 percent of gross domestic product between 1995 
and 2005. Similarly, those costs in The Netherlands increased from 9.7 to over 12 % of GDP 
between 2005 and 2010 according to the OECD Health data. One of the problems of assessing 
data over time, however, is the changing definition of health care services listed as health 
expenditure. But still, the general trend of high medical inflation did not reverse after the  
introduction of the insurance mandate in either country.  By themselves, those increases are no 
proof of failure or success of the new model of “consumer-driven health care” in either country 
as it is hard to attribute behavioral changes to any specific policy measure. But the high 
expenditure growth does not suggest a major success in cost control either to say the least. Some 
proponents of the market-oriented changes in Holland pointed to the fact that the prices of the 
20% or so share of hospital care under the financial responsibility of insurers has gone up 
somewhat less than the 80% of hospital expenditure that remained under direct government price 
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control [6, 37]. At the same time, the volume of the former services went up disproportionally [6, 
13].  
 
### table 1 about here ### 
 
### table 2 about here ### 
 
Second, relatively low and skewed consumer mobility has been another common result. 
In 2007, about one fifth of Dutch insured changed insurer, mostly via collective contracts. The 
next years, however, less than 5 per cent did so, and over 80 percent of those changed plan under 
a collective employment-based contract [36]. Thus in fact, less than one per cent of the 
population acted as individual consumers. If anything, the new scheme strengthened the role of 
Dutch employers in the health insurance (as they took a more active role in selecting plans for 
their employees, both the former sick fund members and previously private insured), even while 
its basic underlying notion is that of individual choice. Likewise, Swiss citizens initially showed 
little interest in shopping around for health insurance [38, 39]. Less than 3 percent switched in 
2007, but the switching rate rose to 12 percent in 2009 and to 15% in 2010, in particular after 
insurers offered a double rebate for managed care plans with high deductibles. “Partial exit” (to 
another plan with the same insurer) occurred more frequently, mostly in high deductible plans 
(with deductibles of over US$ 720 per year). Predictably, in both countries, young, relatively 
wealthy and healthy insured changed plan more often than others. Thus, in fact, persons who 
need health care most – the elderly, disabled or chronic ill – were the least likely to act as 
consumers forcing insurers to improve their contracts with health care providers. In both 
countries, the fact that younger and healthier insured (attracted by lower premiums rather than 
better quality or “integrated care”) switched plan more often than the older or sicker groups 
suggests a form of self-selection rather than active consumerism that would help improve the 
quality of health care or the collaboration between providers. There is no evidence in either 
Holland or Switzerland that older and sicker patients are organizing themselves into associations 
that reflect their interest or willingness to become active health insurance “consumers.”   
Third, the numbers of uninsured and delinquent payers went up after the introduction of 
the insurance mandates. The Swiss government imposed very strict (and some would argue, 
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intrusive) administrative rules to safeguard adherence to the insurance mandate. Canton 
authorities compare the data of health insurers with the regional population registry, and when 
they find discrepancies, they urge individuals to take out insurance (or face fines). Still, with that 
strict control, there were rising rates of non-payment in 2010 [40]. In Holland, the number of 
uninsured and delinquent payers (who had not paid premiums for over 6 months) went up 
sharply after 2006 to about 3 percent of the population (from an earlier base of about 1%) in spite 
of efforts to reduce those populations.   
Four, both countries experienced an acceleration of market concentration in health insurance 
and health care. The numbers of independent health insurers went down, especially in Holland 
but also in Switzerland [41]. As Swiss insurers cannot contract selectively, Swiss hospitals felt 
less pressure than their Dutch counterparts to consolidate their market positions. Anticipating 
earlier health reforms of the late 1980s (even while those reforms were only partially 
implemented), Dutch hospitals, nursing homes, home care organizations and other providers 
engaged in processes of vertical and horizontal integration to strengthen their market positions 
[19]. The 2006 insurance mandate triggered an acceleration of that concentration trend, resulting 
in smaller numbers of bigger hospitals and multi-location hospital systems and long-term care 
facilities. In several regions, institutions offering inpatient and ambulatory mental care merged, 
in some cases creating virtual regional monopolies. Most Dutch family practitioners (GPs) as 
well as some other professionals, however, continued to work solo or in a small group practice. 
The 2006 health insurance legislation assumes that each hospital and every GP practice will 
negotiate with all health insurers on an individual base. Hospitals, as noted above, sought to 
strengthen their market position by merging with others. Only in a very few cases such mergers 
were blocked by the national competition authority. To overcome administrative fragmentation 
and reduce the administrative burden, Dutch GPs set up legal entities that serve as collective 
bargaining agencies in their region. Thus, while the 2006 “managed competition-reform” in The 
Netherlands aimed to create competitive markets where individual insurers were to selectively 
contract with individual health care providers, those actors effectively eliminated or reduced 
competition by strengthening their market positions, also reducing the need to engage in 
individual bargaining. The weakening of the centralized collective bargaining that characterized 
the former neo-corporatist system also eroded the cost control mechanisms (price and capacity 
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controls) at the central level. Organizational change took place, but not in the direction that the 
reformers had expected or hoped for.    
Five, both Switzerland and The Netherlands are shifting towards care-based payment for 
hospital care (presented as an essential element in creating transparency about health care 
services), but in strikingly different ways. The development of case-based payments (in most 
countries labeled “diagnosis-related group” payment or DRGs) in Holland illustrates the need to 
compare countries’ reform processes in a detailed and disaggregated way before drawing general 
conclusions [42]. Rather than just copying the existing payment model of Australia or the United 
States, the Dutch government decided to take an idiosyncratic course in the 1990s. It encouraged 
medical specialists and local hospitals to develop case-based tariffs themselves, and to include 
detailed information about diagnoses, medical treatment and the use of different inputs for each 
category of patients, in the local setting. This decentralized process led to over 40,000 tariffs for 
“diagnosis-treatment combinations” (that covered less than 20 percent of all hospital activity in 
2007). The implementation of this “home-grown”, very complicated and very expensive DRG-
based hospital payment model slowed down, and in 2011 (as in 2007), government announced a 
drastic simplification but as of the writing of this article it is not yet clear what the final outcome 
will be.  
Finally, it is important to note that the insurance mandates of Switzerland and Holland 
did not replace government planning and control. The current systems show an intricate overlap 
or “layering” of competing and sometimes conflicting governance models [43]. In both 
Switzerland and The Netherlands, the current health care system is less market-oriented than 
some experts claim, or some foreign observers seem to hope. While the policy rhetoric 
emphasizes market efficiency, less government and more consumer choice, the Swiss and Dutch 
governments actually expanded their role in monitoring and supervision of health care. For 
example, a new legislation to strengthen federal control over health insurers is under discussion 
in the Swiss Parliament and Cantons set up a new agency for health technology assessment as a 
base for defining entitlements. The Dutch Health Ministry continues to monitor and control 
health costs by setting global budgets, price controls and other measures. It has not reduced its 
active role in the development of health information technology, the development of case-based 
payments for hospitals and quality control – hardly, as some commentators claimed, a “hands-off 
approach with government’s role reduced to that of an umpire” [5].  
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4 Conclusions  
 
Assessing the outcomes of health care reform requires first of all an accurate understanding of 
the current situation and of the assumptions underlying the policy change, including expectations 
of policy-makers about the behavioral changes of all the parties affected by the reforms and the 
final results. In assessing the health reform experience of Switzerland and The Netherlands, this 
article has highlighted three major gaps: one between the underlying assumptions of the model of 
managed competition and the actually implemented insurance reforms (in particular the 
assumptions about behavioral change of insurers, health care providers, patients and insured and 
governments); another gap between expectations and outcomes of the reforms (in particular 
expectations about cost control, efficiency and integrated care fueled by market pressure of 
active consumers in health care on competing insurers and competing health care providers)  and 
the third gap between the experiences of Switzerland and Holland and the international 
commentary that depicts the two countries a successful beacons of “consumer-driven health 
care”, worth following by others (in particular the suggestion that in both countries, markets 
would replace the role of governments in allocating resources for health care in an efficient and 
consumer-friendly way).6 
Models look appealing on paper, but they are difficult to implement as planned and 
during implementation—as in all fields of social policy—governments will face pressure of 
organized opposition groups to change and adjust their course. Swiss and Dutch health insurers, 
as well as Dutch hospitals and GPs—used strategies to defend and strengthen their market 
positions that in some cases all but defeated competition policies. The crucial assumptions of the 
“managed competition” or “consumer-driven health care” model are that concerning consumers 
will carefully select their health plan, and that (competing) insurers will negotiate contracts with 
(competing) providers who will feel pressure to offer good quality care at lower costs. The model 
thus has consumers “choosing” their providers via the insurance plan. But there is little evidence 
that Dutch insurers felt pressured by their insured to use their selective contracting power to 
improve the quality and patient-friendliness of care or to keep costs down after the introduction 
of “consumer-driven health care” [6].  
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In fact, market concentration became their preferred strategy. In both Switzerland and 
Holland, young and healthy employed persons were the main switchers, lured by lower 
premiums or supplemental coverage for non-essential services—not by better basic health care. 
The elderly, handicapped and chronic ill—the groups who need basic health care most—were the 
least likely to change plans. Some commentators have argued that even a modest degree of 
consumer exit may create effective competition (even as there is no agreement on what would 
count as a minimal critical mass). But if the exiting groups are not the relevant consumers, their 
exit does not create the desired or expected market pressure.   
Finally, as we have argued elsewhere, both the Swiss and Dutch experiences confirm the 
need for “post-reform maintenance” [44]. Reforming complex health care systems is not a one-
shot effort as unexpected and undesired outcomes may force governments to adjust their course. 
For example, the rise of numbers of uninsured and delinquent payers prompted government 
action, sometimes changing the rules of the game for certain categories of insured. In several 
cases, governments (partially) reinstated entitlements it had de-listed previously (for example, 
dental care in Holland or homeopathic medicine in Switzerland) after strong opposition. In both 
countries, certain categories of patients are exempt from user fees and governments imposed 
annual caps on the total amounts of user fees families have to pay. In Holland, the mandatory 
deductible does not apply to general practitioners, dental care for children or childbirth care. All 
those exemptions weaken or eliminate the role of “health care consumers” They illustrate the 
need for government action after implementing reforms that supposedly give the reigns to non-
government actors.    
The Swiss and Dutch experiences with “consumer-driven health care” should prompt 
other jurisdiction to be careful in adapting this model. In fact, the “triple gap” mentioned above 
illustrates how ill-defined and hardly tested policy ideas or theoretical models travel faster 
around the world than accurate descriptions of reforms processes and critical assessments of 
outcomes. As Rudolf Klein once observed [45], we have to learn about the experience of others 
before we can learn from that experience—let alone try to transfer policy ideas without carefully 
assessing their operational feasibility and likelihood of success.    
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Health care expenditure per capita, selected countries, 1980-2010 (US$ purchasing 
power parity) 
1980 1990 2000 2010
Canada 777.4 1735.3 2518.8 4444.9
France 667.3 1443.7 2544.8 3974.0
Germany 976.7 1798.1 2677.8 4338.4
Netherlands 733.1 1413.6 2340.3 5056.2
Switzerland 1032.6 2029.9 3221.5 5269.6
United States 1101.8 2850.7 4790.5 8232.9
OECD Average  
 Source: OECD Health Data 2012 
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Table 2: Health care expenditure as share of gross domestic product, selected countries, 1980-
2010 (% of GDP) 
 1980 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Canada 7.0 8.9 9.0 8.8 9.8 11.4
France 7.0 8.4 10.4 10.1 11.2 11.6
Germany 8.4 8.3 10.1 10.4 10.8 11.6
Netherlands 7.4 8.0 8.3 8.0 9.8 12.0
Switzerland 7.4 8.2 9.6 10.2 11.2 11.4
United States 9.0 12.4 13.7 13.7 15.8 17.6
OECD Average  
Source: OECD Health Data 2012 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 This contribution is partly based on Okma and Crivelli [46] 
2 There is a remarkable lack of knowledge of consumer preferences—few if any countries have asked citizens what 
type of health insurance or health care they prefer or need, in particular frail elderly or disabled or chronic ill 
patients—or whether they want to be the “drivers” of health care.  
3 The more recent example of the difficulties to carry-out reforms in the Swiss health system is the outcome of the 
popular ballot held on June 17th 2012.  In spite of a six-years long debate in Parliament that led to an almost 
balanced draft bill accepted by the majority of political parties, the FMH (the Swiss Medical Association) launched 
a referendum and was extremely successful in convincing the citizens that the new law would undermine patients’ 
free choice of physician. Indeed the new law was rejected by an overwhelming majority of voters (76%). 
4 Obviously, changes in the composition of health care funding (say from social insurance to private insurance or out 
of pocket spending) have major distributional consequences [47]. 
5 The administration of the fiscal subsidy turned out to be complex and expensive—the Tax Department had to hire 
over 600 extra staff to calculate and adjust the monthly premium subsidy amounts of fiscal subsidy for all eligible 
insured.  
6 This contribution does not consider changes in the health of Swiss or Dutch citizens as (potential) “outcome” of the 
health care reforms, for different reasons. The first is that the stated reform goals of the insurance mandates 
primarily aimed to improve quality and efficiency of health care services, and not directly aimed to improve 
population health. Second, changes in health status (e.g. measured as an increase in life expectancy or drop in child 
mortality) occur gradually over time. Third, such changes are  as much associated with rising incomes, improved 
living and working conditions or life style changes as with explicit government policy. Both Switzerland and 
Holland are generally wealthy and healthy countries, and their reforms did not lead to major change in health 
indicators. 
